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ABSTRACT 
Weakly completely mixed bimatrix games are defined to be games with a 
completely mixed Nash component. For these games this component turns out to 
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consist of only one point, which is isolated, Special classes of these games are 
completely mixed matrix and bimatrix games, the first introduced by Kaplan&y, the 
latter by Raghavan. We give a characterization f these games, which can be used for 
completely mixed matrix games also. Given a completely mixed strategy pair, we are 
able to construct a (weakly) completely mixed bimatrix game having this pair as an 
equilibrium. We derive interesting results for the case where the payoff matrices have 
a nonnegative and irreducible inverse. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
An interesting subclass of matrix games is the class of completely mixed 
matrix games. By definition all equilibria of such games are completely 
mixed, i.e. give to every pure strategy of both players some relevance. 
Kaplansky [7] was able to calculate the value of an arbitrary matrix game by 
considering completely mixed subgames. Blackwell [l] gave an alternative 
proof of the Perron-Frobenius theorem by constructing special completely 
mixed games. Since then many authors have studied the relationship be- 
tween completely mixed matrix games and the eigenvalues of the matrix 
involved [ 12, E-171. Raghavan showed that many of the characterizations of 
M-matrices mentioned in the literature are consequences of the theory of 
completely mixed matrix games and the Perron-Frobenius theorem [14]. 
These results for completely mixed matrix games are a good motivation to 
consider completely mixed equilibria in bimatrix games. Raghavan [13] 
extended the definition of completely mixed games to bimatrix games and 
found that a completely mixed bimatrix game posesses a unique and com- 
pletely mixed equilibrium (also cf. [SJ and [ll]). Earlier Kaplansky 171 had 
shown that a similar result holds for completely mixed matrix games. 
In general the set of equilibria of a bimatrix game consists of a finite 
number of convex components [6, $1. In this paper we introduce and study 
wea& co$e&ly mixed bimatrix games; a game is defined to be weakly 
completely mixed if at least one convex component of the set of equilibria 
consists of only completely mixed equilibria. This definition implies that 
completely mixed bimatrix games are weakly completely mixed. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we recall some 
basic facts of the theory of bimatrix games, and we concentrate on maximal 
Nash subsets. In Section 3 we define and characterize weakly completely 
mixed bimatrix games. We find that such games have a unique completely 
mixed equilibrium. The diEerence from completely mixed bimatrix games is 
that other equili.bria may exist. Furthermore we sum up some proPerties of 
y mixed bima n Section 4 we show that for a 
~~etely mixed tegies it is possible to construct a weakly 
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completely mixed bimatix game having this pair as an equilibrium. We 
define a special type of games for this purpose. For games in this typical 
form we are able to decide under what conditions they are completely mixed. 
Finally, in Section 5, we consider bimatrix games consisting of two matrices 
that have nonsingular irreducible and nonnegative inverse matrices. These 
games are weakly completely mixed, and for each player the payoffs yielded 
by the completely mixed equilibrium are strictly smaller than the payoffs 
yielded by any other equilibrium. Furthermore we derive that the absolute 
value of any eigenvalue of the matrices is strictly larger than the payoff 
yielded by the completely mixed equilibrium, i.e. with respect to the matrix 
in question. 
NOTATION. By N we denote the set of positive integers. R” is the set of 
n-tuples of real numbers. For a convex set V we denote by relint(V) #0 the 
interior of V with respect to its afEne hull. For a finite set V we denote by 
IV1 the number of elements in V. The rank of a matrix A is denoted by 
rank(A). A matrix A is called strictly positive, and we write A > 0, if all the 
entries of A are positive. A matrix A is called positive or nonnegative if all 
its entries are nonnegative. Similar definitions are used for vectors in R”, 
n>l. Welet e 1, 2,. . . , e, be the standard basis in R”. By 1, we mean the e 
vector in R” with the integer 1 in all its entries. For x, y E R”, (x l y) = 
CT=, xiyi* 
2. BIMATRIX GAMES AND MAXIMAL NASH SUBSETS 
An m X n game is a two-person game defined by a pair (A, B) of real 
m X n matrices. In a play of such a game each of two players chooses a 
(mixed) strategy, which is an element of the set Am for the first player and 
A,, for the second player. Here for t E N 
Corresponding to the strategy pair (p, 9) E Atn x An, the payoffs in this game 
to player 1 and 2 are pA9 and pB9 respectively. A pair (ii, 4) E A,n X A, is 
called an equili~um of the bimatrix gaze (A, B) if gA@ = maxp E A,,, pAij 
and j?Bq = max cl E *,, $39. E(A, 23) denotes the set of all equilibria of the 
game (A, B). The set E(A, B) is nonempty by a theorem of Nash [9, IO]. 
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For a strategy p E At we define its carrier by 
The set of pure best answers for player 1 to the strategy 9 of player 2 is 
defined by 
, 
PB,(91= \ lie{1 ,...,m} eiAq= max 




denotes the set of pure answers for player 2 to the strategy p of player 1. It is 
a well-known result that, for a given pair (p, 9) of strategies, (p, 9) E E(A, I?) 
if and only if C(p) c PB,(q) and C(9) c PB,(p). 
Let S c E(A, B). Two points (p, 9) and (p’, 9’) in S are called S-inter- 
changeable if (p, 9’) E S and (p’, 9) E S. We call S a Nash s&set for the 
game (A, B) if every pair of equilibria in S is S-interchangeable. A Nash 
subset S is called maximal if there does not exist a Nash subset T c E(A, 23) 
such that S is properly contained in T. Note that a maximal Nash subset is 
convex. 
The following two Olcorcms concerning nnaximal Nash subsets are due to 
Jansen [6]: 
TflEClREM 1. The set of equilibria of a bi~nut~~ game is the not necessar- 
ily disjoint union of a finite numlkr of maximal Nash subsets. 
IIEOiuZM 2. Let (A, II) be an m x II bimatrix game, and let S be a 
~n.a~~~~~ Nash subset for this game. Suppose that C$, ~$1 E relint(S). Then 
S = K(@ x L(p). Here K(tj) = (p E A,,, l(p, y”> E E(A, B)} and L(g) = 
19 E A,, I@, 9) E E(A, IO). 
REMARK 1. A matrix game A can be seen as a bimatrix game (A, - Ab. 
It is well known that E(A, - A) is the only maximal Nash subset for 
A) and tha'.t for ewk plajer the payoff is independent of the equi- 
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3. WEAKLY COMPLETELY MIXED BIMATRIX GAMES 
In this section we define and give a characterization of weakly completely 
mixed bimatrix games. Furthermore we give some properties of these games. 
DEFINITION. For t E N, a stmtegy x E A, is said to be completely 
mixed if x E b, := relint( At). 
A game (A, 23) is called completely mixed if for all (p, 9) E E(A, B) both 
p and 9 are completely mixed strategies. In this case we call such an 
equilibrium (p, 9) a completely mixed equilibrium. We define a game (A, B) 
to be weakly completely mixed if there exists a maximal Nash subset 
S c E(A. B) such that all equilibria in S are completely mixed. 
Raghavan [13] found that a completely mixed m x n bimatrix game 
(A, B) has the properties m = n, rank(A),rank(B) E (n - 1, n), and I E(A, B)l 
= 1. So the set of equilibria of a completely mixed bimatrix game only 
contains one maximal Nash subset, which consists of only one (completely 
mixed) equilibrium. This implies that a completely mixed bimatrix game is 
weakly completely mixed. In view of Remark I we find that, if we restrict to 
matrix games, the definitions of weakly completely mixed and completely 
mixed coincide. 
In the following theorem we characterize the class of weakly completely 
mixed bimatrix games. Since the equilibrium set of a bimatrix game does not 
change if the same constant is added to all the entries of one of the matrices, 
we may suppose without loss of generality that both matrices are strictly 
positive. 
TIIEOREM 3. Let A > 0 and B > 0. Then (A, B) is a weakZy completely 
mixed bimutrix game if and only if 
(1) A and B are square matrices, say n X n; 
(2) A and B have full rank; 
(3) all entries of both 1, B- ’ and A- ’ 1 n are positive. 
Proof. a: Let (A, B) be a weakly completely mixed bimatrix game, and 
let S be a completely mixed minimal Nash subset for (A, B). Take (p, 9) E 
relint(S). 
Suppose ranks B) < m - 2. Then there are two linearly independent solu- 
tions of xB = 0. At least one of these, say x, is linearly independent of p. 
First suppose Cr! 1 zi # 0. Without loss of generality we may suppose EL, zi 
= 1. Now let p’ = (A + l)p - Ax, with A > 0. want p’ to be a strategy 
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with at least 01.e coordinate equal to zero. Therefore we take A such that 
A-VA + I)= maxi,{,,...,,) zipi-l* Then p’Aq = pAq. Furthermore p’Bq = 
(I+ h)pBq 3 (1 + A)pBq^ = p’Bq^ for all @ E 8 n. Hence p’ E K(q). According 
to Theorem 2 we now have (p’, q) E S. This contradicts S being completely 
mixed. Thus rank(B) > m - 1 if Cr!. i zi f 0. a similar proof handles the case 
for which ET=i Zi = 0, if one chooses p’ = p - AZ for a suitable A. We 
conclude rank(B) >, m - 1. 
Suppose rank(B) = m - 1. Then there exists a y E Rm, y # 0, such that 
yB = 0. However if y is linearly independent of p, we can again construct a 
p’ that is not completely mixed while (p’, q j E S. This contradicts S being 
completely mixed. Therefore pB = 0. However, this is impossible, since 
B > 0 and p > 0. Hence rank(B) = m. Similarly one proves rank(A) = n. 
Since rank(B) = m implies that n 3 m and rank(A) = n imp’aies that m 3 n, 
we have m = n. Thus we have proved (I) and (2). 
Then, since pB = Al n and A9 = pl n for some positive reals A and cc, we 
obtain l,B-’ =A-‘p and A-‘1, = p - ‘9. Hence also (3) is firlfilled. 
c= : Assume that (l), (2), and (3) are fulfilled. Define p = 
(I,B-ll,)-ll,B-i > 0 and 9 = (l,A-ll,)-lA-ll, > 0. Then PBej = 
(l,,B”l,)-’ for all j, and e,Aq =(l,A-‘l,)-’ for all i. Hence cp,9) is a 
completely mixed equilibrium of the game (A, B). Since A and B are 
nonsingular, and CyG Ip, = 1 and Ey= rqj = 1, we find that (p, 9) is the only 
completely mixed equilibrium. Moreover, (p,q) is isolated or else other 
completely mixed equilibria exist. So ((p, 9)) is a completely mixed maximal 
Nash subset. This shows that (A, B) is weakly completely mixed. m 
Now we sum up some results for “general’* bimatrix games, i.e. not 
necessarily with two strictly positive matrices. 
Carefully looking at the proof of Theorem 3, we find that a bimatrix with 
two strictly positive matrices that is weakly completely mixed posesses a 
unique and isolated completely mixed equilibrium. However, then also in 
general 
~ROFOSITION 1 t A weakly completely mixed bimatrix gang has a unique 
and isolated completely mixed equilibrium. 
In the - part of the proof above we did not use the fact that A and B 
are strictly positive; hence: 
PROPOSITION 2. lf or an ordered pair of matrices (A, B) conditions (0, 
(2), and (3) of TI leorem 3 hold, then (A, B) is a weakly completely mixed 
bim.atrix game. 
Suppose (A, B) is weakly completely mixed. Then we add constants c 
d to the entries of A and B respectively, such that the resulting 
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matrices A’ and B’ are strictly positive. Then A’ and B’ have properties (I), 
(2), and (3) of Theorem 3, aud consequently - A’ and - B’ have properties 
(1) and (2) of Th eorem 3. Following the e= part of the proof of Theorem 3, 
we find that (- A’, - B’) is weakly completely mixed. Then, by adding c to 
every entry of - A’ and d to every entry of - B’, we find 
PROPOSITION 3. If (A, B) is weakly completely mixed, then also 
(- A, - B) is weakly completely mixed. 
The 3x3 bimatrix game given by 
(ho) (0,o) (OJ) 
(W) 
(ho) 1 
is completely mixed, since the only equilibrium is ((i, 5, $),(i, f, i)). This 
strategy pair is also an equilibrium of (- A, - B). However, (- A, - B) is 
not completely mixed, since e.g. (e,, e,) is also equilibrium of this game. So 
in general Proposition 2 does not hold for completely mixed bimatrix games. 
Let B’ be the matrix obtained from B above by exchanging the first and 
the second column of B. Then (e,, e,) iS an equilibrium of (A, B’), and hence 
(A, B’) is not completely mixed. Howt:ver, (A, 23’) is weakly completely 
mixed, as the next proposition tells us. First we need a definition. 
DEFINITION. An n X n matrix P obtained from the n X n identity 
matrix by permuting its columns is called a permutation matrix. 
With this definition at hand it follows easily that 
PROPOSITION 4. If (A, B) is weakly completely mixed, then the permuted 
game ( P, AP,, P3 BP,) is also weakly completely mixed, where Pi is a permu- 
tation matrix for all i. 
Porm the c= part of the proof of Theorem 3 we obtain that the 
completely mixed equilibrium (p, q) of a weakly completely mixed bimatrix 
game (A, B) with two strictly positive matrices satisfies the equations 
= v-’ A-‘1, 
P lpi” ad 4 = i,A-‘1, ’ 
Then, since A and B are nonsicguiar, it is straightforward to show that the 
set of all n X n weakly completely mixed bimatrix games is an open subset of 
the set of all n X 92 bimatrix games. 
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Hence small perturbations of the matrices of a weakly completely mixed 
bimatrix game lead to matrices &at again form a weakly completely mixed 
game. The completely mixed equilibrium of the perturbed game can be 
calculated as in Cohen [3], where perturbations of completely mixed bimatrix 
games were considered. Perturbations theory for completely mixed matrix 
games has been studied in Cohen [2]. 
REMARK 2. Suppose (A, B) is a weakly completely mixed n X n bimatrix 
game and that A is strictly positive and B is singular. Closely looking at the 
proof of Theorem 3 we find that in that case rank(B) = n - 1. Consequently 
there exists a x E R", z f 0, such that 232 = 0. Let us add to every entry of 
B a constant c such such that the resulting matrix B’ is strictly positive. 
Then also (A, 23’) is weakly completely mixed. Hence, by Theorem 3, 
B’ is nonsingular. Consequently 0 z B’z = ~(1; =)I,&. So c is nonzero and 
(In’ x) z 0. 
Now suppose B is a singular n X n matrix with the property rank.(B) = 
n - 1, which, for eigenvalue zero, has a left eigenvector p > 0 and a right 
eigenvector that is not perpendicular to 1,. Let us add to every entry of B a 
constant c such that the resulting matrix B’ is strictly positive. Then 
@3’ - cl”, where fi = (pa I,)-‘p E 8,. Suppose that B’u = 0 for some u E R" 
with u f 0. Then 0 = f?B’u = ~$1; u), or (l,* r~) = 0. However, this implies 
0 = B’u = Bu + c( l,* u) = Bu, which contradicts our assumption. Hence B’ is 
nonsingular. Now take a nonsingular n X n matrix A satisfying A- ’ 1, > 0. 
Then (A, B’) satisfies all three conditions of Theorem 3 and is therefore 
weakly completely mixed. This implies that also (A, B) is weakly completely 
mixed. 
Tim, by the arguments above, we have found a characterization similar 
to the one in Theorem 3 for the ease of a ~~~g~~~r mairix B. Conditions (2) 
and (31, with respect to B, are altered into: 
(2) ranM B) = n - 1 
(3) For eigenvalue zero, B has a left eigenveetor that is strictly positive 
and a right eigenvestor that is uot perpendicular to I,,. 
A similar characterization can be given in the case of a singular matrix A. 
4. CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS 
From the previous section we learn that weakly completely mixed 
bimatrix games have square matrices and possess a unique completely mixed 
equilibrium. tely mixed bimatrix games are weakly 
n natural to ask the following questions. 
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Giver: a pair (P,q) E 8, X A,, can we construct a weakly completely mixed 
n x n bimatrix game for which (p, 9) is an equilibrium? If we can do this, 
then under what conditions is the game completely mixed? Or equivalently, 
under what conditions is (p, 9) then the only equilibrium of the game? 
in this section we construct a class of bimatrix games with help of which 
we can obtain an answer to the first question. It is also possible for games in 
this class to give an exact answer to the second question. 
DEFINITION. A bijection r : (1,. . . , n} + (1,. . . , n} is called irreducible if 
there exists no proper subset Z c { 1,. . . , n} such that V(Z) = 1. 
TIrEoRErvl 4. Let (p,q)~ 8, X b, be given. Let r be a bijection on 
(1 , . . . , n}. Let A and B be the n X n matrices defined by 
Bej = pJ. Iej 
for all j, and 
for all . 
Then the bimatrix game (A, B) is weakly completely mixed. It is com- 
pletely mixed if and only if w is irreducible. For all bijections v the unique 
completely mixed equilibrium. is ( p, 9). 
Proof. The proof consists of four steps. 
First we prove that (A, B) is weakly completely mixed. Not2 that A and 
B are nonsingular and square. In fact 1, B- ‘ej = pj > 0 for all j, and 
elA-‘l,J = 9r > 0 for all i. By Proposition 2 the game (A, B) is weakly mixed. 
Secondly we show that ( p, 9) E E( A, B), which assertion is, by Proposi- 
tion 1, equivalent to the statement that (p,q) is the unique completely mixed 
equilibrium of (A, B). We have pBej = 1 for all j and e,A9 = 1 for all i. 
I-Ience C(p) = PB,(y) and C(9) = PB,(p). Consequently (p, 9) E E(A, B). 
In the third step we prove that (A, 9) is completely mixed for every 
irscducible rr. Let (x, y) E E(A, B). Then C(y) C PB&x) and C(X) c PB,( y). 
Furthermore, for this equilibrium we also have 
= i jE(l,...,n} xjp,rl = max I k E{l....,n) %Pkl > 







C(iE(1 ,...,n}1+) EC(Y))- 
Hence C(y)C{i ~{l,..., n} I w(i) E C(y)} = {w-‘(i) E (1,. . . , n} I i E 
C(y)}. Since rr is bijection, we find &C(y)) = C(y). Now if P is irre- 
ducible, this means C(y) = (1,. . . , n}. Thus we obtain (1,. . . , n} = C(y) c 
P&(r) C C(X). Equivalently, (x, y) is completely mixed. Then in view of the 
C= part of the proof of Theorem 3, we find (x, y) = (p, 9). 
Finally we have to prove that if (A, B) is a completekr mixed game, then 
rr is irreducible. Suppose a is not. Then there is a proper subset Z c { 1,. . . , n} 
such that V(Z) = 1. Define (x, y) E An X A, by 
xi = (CkE[Pk)-‘pi if iE 1, ( 0 otherwise 
and 
We obtain 
xz3ej = ( (CkclpJ’ if .j 0 otherwise ,
e,Ay = 
= C< e n(i) -4919,f) c 92 
1Cl kEl 
(&.&,?k)-’ if i Ek 
0 otherwise, 
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and we see that C(X) = PB,( y) and C(y) = PB,(r ), or equivalently, that 
(x, y) E E(A, B). By construction (x, y) is not completely mixed. This contra- 
dicts our assumption. Hence 7r must be irreducible. The proof of the 
theorem is completed. 
Without proof we give an extension of the result in Theorem 4 which tells 
us that if we also perform a permutation on the above matrix B, we have a 
completely mixed game iff the composition of the two permutations is an 
irreducible permutation. 
THEOREM 5. Let (p,q)~ b, X 8, be given. Let w and p be bijections 
on {l ,..., n}.LetAandBbethenxnmutrices&j&aedby 
for all j E (1,. . . , n), and 
for all i E{l,...,n). 
Then the bimatrix game ~4, B) is weakly completely mixed. It is com- 
pletely mixed if and only if wp a- irreducible. For all bijections v and p the 
unique completely mixed equilibrium is (p, 9). 
EXAMPLE 1. Let (A, B) be the bimatrix game given by 
(093) (3,o) (a,o) 
In the notation of Theorem 5 we can obtain A and B by defining 7r by 
and p by 
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The permutations r and p are both not irreducible, but ?rp is, since it 
equals 
Hence (A, B) is completely mixed by Theorem 5. 
5. PAYOFFS AND EICENVALUES 
In this section we describe a subclass of weal& completely mixed 
bimatrix games for which the payoffs yielded by the comF!etely mixed 
equilibrium are smaller than those yielded by other eqllilibria. Moreover, for 
the same subclass this pair of payoffs is also smaller than the absolute value 
of every eigenvalue of the pair of matrices to which they belong. For the 
specification of the subclass we need the notion of an irreducible matrix. 
DrXWurrIoN. A square matrix A is called reducible if there is a permu- 
tation matrix P such that 
where 63 and D are square matrices. Qthenvise A is called irreducible. 
In the proof of the theorem we use the Pen-on-Frobenius theorem, which 
says: 
Eusrv nonnegative irreducible n x n matrix A has a positive eigenvulue h, 
which is at leust as large as the crbsolute vulue of any other eigenvalue. This 
eigenvalmc IS simple, und ita cigmvector has all coordinates trictly of the 
same sign. 
ck? e.g. [4, p. 531). 
THEOREM 6. Let A” and B- ’ be two nonnegative irreducible n X n 
matrices. Then (A, B) and (B, A) are weakly completely mixed bimatrix 
games. 
Let (p,q) be the completely mixed equilibrium of (A, B). The pAq is 
strictly smaller than the absolute value of every eigenvalue of A, and pBq is 
st~ctly smaller than the absolute value of every eigenvalue of B. 
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Furthermore, let @, 4’) E E(A, B) be another equilibrium. Then pAq < 
fiAq and pBq < PBq’. Similar statements hold for (B, A). 
Proof. Since A-’ and B- ’ x-e nonsingular matrices, they cannot have a 
row or column with just zero entries. They are also nonnegative, and 
therefore both (A, B) and (B, A) are weakly completely mixed by Proposition 
2. We only prove the assertions for the game (A, B), and with respect to *his 
game only for B. According to the Perron-Frobenius theorem we 3an find a 
positive A, E R and a strictly positive x E R” such that B-‘z = A+. All 
other eigenvalues can be ordered so that A, >/ lhrl z * * * z IA,l, s \< n - 1. 
For i E{l,..., s} we have Byi = Ai ’ yi if yi is an eigenvector of B - ’ 
belonging to the eigenvalue Ai. Also Bz = Ai’z. Hence we have the ordering 
A,’ < IA;‘1 < l . . < IAL ‘1 for the eigenvalues of B. Since (p, q) is a corn- 
pletely mixed equilibrium, it follows that pBz = (pBqxl,-i;) = Ai ‘(p-3) < 
A,‘(ln.z), or pBq < A,‘. This proves the first assertion. 
Let CY = (fiBq’)l, - PB. Then CY >, 0, and since (fi,9) is not completely 
mixed, it follows that there is at least one j E (1,. . . , n} for which aj > 0. This 
yields j5B = (@Bg’)l, - a, or p = (fiBq”)l”B-’ - cuB_‘. Therefore, since 
l,B-‘1, = l/pBq, we have 1 = (l,*$= fiBq’/pBq - CUB-‘1, or equiva- 
lently aB-‘1, = fiBg’/pBq - I. Now since B- ’ 1 n > 0 by an argument above 
and aj > 0 for some j, we have that fiBq’ > pBq. Hence we have obtained 
the second assertion. 
The statements with respect to A can be proved similarly. 0 
REMARK 3. The n X n bimatrix games of Section 4 have the properties 
of Theorem 6. The definition of the games in Theorem 4 is based on a 
completely mixed pair (p,9) E 8, X 8, and a permutation r. The inverse 
matrices are equal to the transposes of the original , where the 9,:’ are 
replaced by 9# and the pi- ’ by p,. Evidently these are nonnegative, irrc- 
ducible, and nonsingular. Let us suppose that ?r is not irreducible, i.e., 
n(I) = I with III< n. Then we obtain from the last part of the proof of 
Theorem 4 that (x, 1~) E E(A, B) for the pair (x, y) defined there. The pay- 
offs due to this equilibrium are xAy = (& 6, 9k)-1 > 1 = pA9 and xBy = 
(Ck I ,pk)-’ > 1 = pB9. Furthermore the eigenvalues of A are the qil and 
those of B the pi ’ for all i. Clearly pA9 = 1 < qi-’ and pB9 = 1 < pi ‘. 
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